Government Debt Expansion and Stock Returns by Wisniewski, Tomasz Piotr & Jackson, Peter M.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Government Debt Expansion and Stock Returns
Journal Item
How to cite:
Wisniewski, Tomasz Piotr and Jackson, Peter M. (2020). Government Debt Expansion and Stock Returns.
International Journal of Finance and Economics (Early Access).
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2020 The Authors
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1002/ijfe.2052
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
R E S E A R CH AR T I C L E
Government debt expansion and stock returns
Tomasz Piotr Wisniewski1 | Peter M. Jackson2
1Faculty of Business and Law,
Department of Accounting and Finance,
The Open University, Walton Hall Milton
Keynes, UK
2University of Leicester School of
Business, Department of Economics,
Finance and Accounting, University of
Leicester, Leicester, UK
Correspondence
Peter M. Jackson, University of Leicester
School of Business, Department of
Economics, Finance and Accounting,
University of Leicester, Ken Edwards
Building, University Road, Leicester, LE1
7RH, UK.
Email: pmj1@le.ac.uk
Abstract
Using an international data set, this article documents a negative association
between increases in the central government debt-to-GDP ratio and dollar-
denominated stock index returns. Depending on the estimation method, rais-
ing the debt ratio by 1 percentage point diminishes the stock returns by
between 39 and 95 basis points. We show that this result cannot be explained
by changes in the investment risk. Instead, government debt issuance exerts
upward pressure on private interest rates and appears to signal a greater tax
burden in the future. These two factors coincide to produce a fall in stock mar-
ket prices.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
For fear of losing popular support, democratically elected
governments may be reluctant to embark on fiscal con-
solidation initiatives involving the raising of distortionary
taxes or cutting expenditure. A society that is not averse
to the idea of leaving negative bequests may opt for per-
sistent deficits, leaving the burden of debt repayment to
future generations (Cukierman & Meltzer, 1989). Popular
anxieties, expressed recently in politicians' public state-
ments and in the press, centre on countries' abilities to
service their debts and the possibility of sovereign debt
default. Indeed, such concerns appear to be well founded,
as the average central government debt to GDP ratio for
OECD countries has risen from 38.7% in 1990 to 100.0%
in 2015.1 Lane (2012) points out that economies laden
with debt are characterized by multiple equilibria with
the distinct possibility of a self-fulfilling speculative
attack. A perception of heightened likelihood of default
will increase yields, which in turn hinders efforts to ser-
vice debt and makes default more probable. The recent
European sovereign debt crisis illustrates this mechanism
and exemplifies the grave ramifications that debt over-
hang can have for the economy, financial markets, and
broader society.
A casual interpretation of governments' policy
announcements might lead to the conclusion that their
policies are based upon sound economic reasoning and
strong empirical evidence. That, however, is far from the
case. Prior to the financial crisis and the ensuing Great
Recession, knowledge of fiscal policy was a highly con-
tested area. Summarizing the current state of scholarship
on fiscal policy, Alesina (2012) concluded: “we as econo-
mists, do not know as much as we would like or perhaps
we should. The issues are complicated...”. One area about
which very little is known is the relationship between
government indebtedness and stock market performance.
With a few exceptions, the literature has been silent on
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this issue. Notably, theoretical linkages between fiscal
policy and stock prices were the subject of work carried
out by Blanchard (1981) and Shah (1984). On the empiri-
cal side, Darratt (1988, 1990) used Canadian data to
examine the relationship between stock market fluctua-
tions and budget deficits. Our paper contributes to the
literature by providing evidence based on a data set
comprising 61 countries. The use of this resource per-
mits us to draw conclusions that are generalizable
internationally.
Our results indicate that stock prices tend to decrease
as governments become more indebted. Depending on
the econometric specification, increasing public debt by
1% of GDP leads to a ceteris paribus drop in the stock
market index ranging from −0.39% to −0.95%. We probe
this issue further and attempt to provide a rationale for
this unfavourable market reaction. Perhaps our finding
could be driven by changes in the risk premium compo-
nent of discount rates, as the threat of government insol-
vency looms larger at higher levels of indebtedness. On
the other hand, public spending stabilizes the economy
in times of recession, providing a safety net for busi-
nesses. On balance, we find no strong evidence that
changes in market risk are associated with issuance of
additional bonds and bills by the government. Neverthe-
less, increasing the stock of public debt exerts an upward
pressure on interest rates and results in a larger tax bur-
den in the future. We believe that these two by-products
of rising debt obligations are responsible for the observed
stock price declines.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.
By reviewing theoretical and empirical studies, the next
section reflects on the channels through which govern-
ment debt expansions could affect stock prices. This
review motivates our research questions and the testing
that follows. Section 3 elaborates on data sources, sample
composition and basic summary statistics. The main body
of empirical evidence on the four hypotheses of interest
is presented in Section 4. Alternative specifications of our
stock returns model are considered in Section 5. We end
this article with concluding remarks and
recommendations.
2 | PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT AND
STOCK PRICES
It is difficult to make a priori predictions about the effect
that issuance of additional government debt may have on
equity prices. Within the framework of the extended IS-
LM model, Blanchard (1981) argued that fiscal expansion
under fixed prices can influence stock values. However,
the direction of the effect is ambiguous within this
setting. Similarly, in the theoretical model of Shah (1984),
short-term jumps in stock prices can occur in response to
an unanticipated increase in government expenditure,
but whether these jumps are upwards or downwards
depend on the parameters of the model. This theoretical
indeterminateness is perhaps exacerbated by the lack of
empirical research in this area. To the best of the authors'
knowledge, no prior study explicitly measured the
response of stock markets to changes in the stock of gov-
ernment obligations. The most closely related research is
that of Darratt (1988, 1990) who focused on the link
between Canadian fiscal deficits and local stock returns.
However, joint reading of these two papers does not nec-
essarily help to resolve the controversy regarding the
direction of the impact.
We begin our theoretical considerations with the con-
ventional frameworks for pricing stocks, namely the divi-
dend discount model (Gordon, 1962; Gordon &
Shapiro, 1956) and cash flow valuation model
(Fisher, 1930; Williams, 1938). At their core, both models
rely on a similar conceptual approach in that they sum
the discounted future benefits accruing to shareholders,
be they measured by dividends or free cash flow to
equity. As we will proceed to argue, government borrow-
ing can influence both the discount rate and the benefits
realized by stock market participants. It is through these
two channels that the impact of public sector debt on
stock valuations could potentially manifest itself.
In standard models, such as the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964) or the
three factor Fama French model (Fama & French, 1993),
the discount rate can be viewed as the risk-free rate aug-
mented by the relevant risk premiums. Yields on short
term government debt are typically taken to approximate
the risk-free rate. However, as pointed out by Blinder and
Solow (1973) flotation of new government debt issues will
exert upward pressure on interest rates and, conse-
quently, on discount rates. Whenever the increase in gov-
ernment bond yields becomes intolerable, the
government may resort to “financial repression” by using
regulatory and other indirect measures to force domestic
financial intermediaries to invest more money in govern-
ment bonds (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Even if such
actions may restrain the yields on government bills and
bonds, they will be unequivocally detrimental to corpora-
tions. The glut of public sector debt held by banks crowds
out corporate lending (Becker & Ivashina, 2018) and will
ultimately increase the costs of corporate borrowing.
From a theoretical perspective, in the IS-LM model, a
fiscal expansion increases aggregate demand and shifts
the IS curve rightwards. This leads to a rise in interest
rates and, relatedly, depresses investments and capital
stock (Faini, 2006). If, however, agents are rational and
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live either indefinitely or in dynasties, they will recognize
that debt issued to finance current tax cuts will have to
be repaid in the future. Consequently, the increase in
current disposable income arising from the tax cut will
be saved by agents, in anticipation of a higher tax burden
in the future. This saving behaviour will offset the
upward pressure on interest rates generated by public
debt expansion. Barro (1974) shows that, in the presence
of operative intergenerational transfer, increasing govern-
ment borrowing leaves interest rates unaffected. To put it
differently, given a certain level of public spending,
agents are indifferent to whether the government chooses
to finance itself by levying taxes or by issuing debt. This
is because debt can be viewed as delayed tax liabilities
(Plosser, 1987). This logic came to be known in the litera-
ture as the “Ricardian equivalence”.
Of course, one may argue that the assumptions neces-
sary to derive this invariance proposition do not hold in
the real world. What is more important, however, is
whether Ricardian equivalence holds empirically. While
there is long-standing discussion on this issue in the liter-
ature, no clear consensus has emerged. By examining
U.S. data, Plosser (1982, 1987) argued that the stock of
public debt is unrelated to interest rates, a result that was
later confirmed by Boothe and Reid (1989) for Canada.
On the other hand, Engen and Hubbard (2005) as well as
Laubach (2009) show a strong positive association
between the projected increase in U.S. federal debt and
forward rates. Similarly, Bernoth, Von Hagen, and
Schuknecht (2003) show that the interest rate spread
between a Eurobond-issuing EU country and Germany
depends on their relative debt changes. In light of these
mixed results, we have decided to conduct our own inde-
pendent analysis.
In addition to the risk-free rate, discount rates also
embody a risk premium element which increases with
the level of uncertainty. Issuance of additional public sec-
tor debt makes the possibility of default or repudiation
more tangible. Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller (2013)
perceptively point out that sovereign default risk can spill
over to the private sector. What is more, poor financial
condition of a government is likely to instigate volatile
developments in the political arena. Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2016) construct an economic policy uncertainty
index derived from the content of newspaper articles and
conclude that some of the index's peaks coincide with
“battles over fiscal policy”. On the other hand, govern-
ment budgets naturally stabilize output variations and
can be used as lifelines for too-big-to-fail privately owned
businesses (Brown, 1955; Fatás & Mihov, 2001; Wren-
Lewis, 2010). The net effect of the forces involved is diffi-
cult to predict and needs to be assessed empirically. For
this reason, we empirically evaluate to what extent the
jumps in the level of prevailing risk, as measured by
changes in stock market volatility, are related to increases
in public debt.
While the discount factor is critical for pricing of
stocks, one also needs to consider the ability of corpora-
tions to generate income, as this will affect both the level
of free cash flows to equity and dividends. Since issuance
of government debt can lead to interest rate increases,
consumers may become disinclined to finance their pur-
chases with credit which, in turn, will lead to a drop in
demand for products. Corporate profitability may be
undermined further by the rising cost of servicing vari-
able rate debt. What is more, investors pay attention to
after-tax cash flows, which is important considering the
view of Barro (1974) and Lucas Jr and Stokey (1983) that
government bonds are simply “congealed future taxes”.
Investors may equate increases in public sector debt to
prospective hikes in corporate, dividend and capital gains
taxes. This is corroborated by the empirical results of
Park (1997), who shows that expected tax changes
implied by yields on tax-exempt municipal bonds are
linked positively to the level of federal debt. Our inquiry
also attempts to establish whether raising government
indebtedness is associated with future tax increases.
3 | DATA
The sample used in this study includes all countries for
which stock market information and government debt
data could be found in our data sets. The country-level
stock market indices used here have been constructed by
MSCI and downloaded from the Thomson Reuters
Datastream. These indices are market capitalization
weighted and denominated in US dollars. The common
currency denomination is necessary, since we are
adopting a global investor's perspective. At the time of
the study, MSCI provided index information for 77 mar-
kets for which we computed continuously compounded
returns. The annual series of government debt-to-GDP
ratio, along with other macroeconomic variables, came
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database
accessed through the UK Data Service. Unlike MSCI, the
WDI data set does not cover Taiwan and Palestine, so
these two nations had to be excluded from our investiga-
tion. Furthermore, there was no debt data for another
14 countries, which led to their exclusion. Consequently,
the final analysis is conducted on a set of 61 countries,
which are listed in Appendix A at the end of this article.
Often the size of cross section in our regressions is
smaller due to availability of control variables and the
need to difference or lag our indicators, which proves
problematic for very short series. The WDI starts to
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provide debt data from 1990, a date marking the begin-
ning of our investigation timeframe. The time series
dimension ends in 2014. At this stage, it must be men-
tioned that, for many nations, it is impossible to obtain
data for the full period, which effectively means that we
are basing our inferences on an unbalanced panel.
Table 1 provides definitions of the variables used in
our study, while Table 2 reports summary statistics. The
dollar-denominated returns averaged about 3.72% per
annum. Credit Suisse (2015) reports that real return aver-
ages computed over a longer period of 115 years exceeded
our estimate for most countries. This is likely to be due to
the fact that part of the sample considered here was
affected by the recent global banking crisis and the eco-
nomic slowdown that followed. The average debt-to-GDP
ratio was 56% and tended to increase by 26 basis points
per annum. We also gauge the changes in stock market
risk using Δlnσ variable, which measures the continu-
ously compounded increase in volatility. Within a given
year, volatility is calculated as a standard deviation of
daily returns. The mean of this variable reported in
Table 2 reveals a tendency towards diminishing riskiness
associated with stock market investments over time. The
interest rate here is that paid on bank deposits, which
represent a convenient alternative to investing in equity.
Depositors struggled to increase their wealth in real
terms, as the mean of Inflation exceeded that of Inter-
est_Rate. However, examination of the statistics for differ-
ent percentiles reveals that depositors' real losses
occurred primarily in nations struggling with hyperinfla-
tion. Our sample countries had, on average, a real growth
rate of 3.22% per annum and unemployment of 8.31%.
Finally, we do not observe any strong trends in the tax
burden imposed by governments. Although the mean
change in the government tax revenue to GDP ratio is
slightly negative, the median has a small positive value.
The last three columns in Table 3 report the results of
three panel root tests. Since each of them relies on a dif-
ferent methodological approach, juxtaposition of the
findings allows us to reach more reliable conclusions.
The first test by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) assumes that
the persistence parameter does not vary across cross-
sectional units and relies on a t-statistic that, under the
null of a unit root, is asymptotically normally distributed.
The version of the test presented here allows for individ-
ual intercepts. The approach of Im, Pesaran, and
Shin (2003) is different in that ADF tests are run sepa-
rately for each of the cross-sectional units. The W-statistic
is based on the standardized average of the t-statistics
obtained from these tests and, under the null, W has an
asymptotic standard normal distribution. Instead of
working with t-statistics, Maddala and Wu (1999) focus
on the p-values from individual unit root tests. These can
TABLE 1 Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source of data
Return Continuously
compounded return
on the MSCI country
stock market index
for a given calendar
year. The return is
denominated in US
dollars and expressed
in percentage points
Thomson Reuters
Datastream
Debt Entire stock of central
government's direct
fixed-term
obligations (% of
GDP)
World
Development
Indicators
ΔDebt First difference in the
Debt variable
World
Development
Indicators
Δlnσ Continuously
compounded rate of
change in stock
market volatility
relative to previous
year expressed in
percentage points.
Volatility is defined
as standard deviation
of daily returns
within a given
calendar year. Dollar
denominated MSCI
country indices were
used to calculate
daily returns
Thomson Reuters
Datastream
Interest_Rate Interest rate on
deposits paid by
banks
World
Development
Indicators
Tax_Increase The difference between
this and last year's
tax burden. Tax
burden is measured
here by tax revenue
expressed as a
percentage of GDP
World
Development
Indicators
GDP_Growth Annual percentage
growth rate in real
GDP expressed in
constant 2005 US
dollars
World
Development
Indicators
Unemployment Share of total
unemployment in the
total labour force
World
Development
Indicators
Inflation Inflation in consumer
price index
(annual %)
World
Development
Indicators
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be combined, according to the principles outlined in the
study by Fisher (1932), to create a test statistic following
a χ2 distribution. Table 2 reveals that, with the exception
of Debt, the hypothesis of unit root is strongly rejected for
all variables. The stationarity of Debt is questionable, con-
sidering that the Im et al. (2003) fails to reject the null,
while the Fisher-ADF test indicates a rejection only at a
10% significance level. Consequently, in the regressions
that follow, we use the first difference of this vari-
able (ΔDebt).
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 | Government debt changes and
stock market returns
As was argued in Section 2, issuance of additional gov-
ernment bonds can increase discount rates and lead to
future tax increases, which would depress valuations of
equities. On the other hand, the traditional Keynesian
view holds that expansionary fiscal policy can provide a
stimulus to the economy, which could benefit share-
holders. The relative validity of these two viewpoints can
only be assessed empirically. To this end, we proceed to
quantitatively measure the influence of central govern-
ment debt increases on stock market valuations. Our pri-
mary objective is to focus on increases in debt, rather
than deficit. This is because debt needs to be sold in the
markets and may consequently influence prices of assets,
while deficit is a purely accounting construct.
Consequently, Table 3 reports models linking our
Return variable with ΔDebt and additional controls.
Models (1) and (2) employ a simple pooled OLS estima-
tion with common intercept, while Models (3) and
(4) include both country and year dummies. Since the
null hypothesis of redundant fixed effects is strongly
rejected, the latter two regressions are preferred on
econometric grounds. The most important finding that
becomes immediately apparent is that, irrespective of the
estimation method and regression specification, issuance
of new government debt depresses stock market valua-
tions. Increase in debt equivalent to 1% of GDP leads to
lowering of the dollar-denominated index returns by
between 39 and 95 basis points. The hypothesis of debt
neutrality is rejected in all models at 5% significance
level, or better. These results add credence to the claim
that stock market investments can be crowded out by
government bonds and bills.
The estimated coefficients on the control variables
warrant further reflection. Firstly, no significant contem-
poraneous association between GDP growth and returns
has been detected. This finding mirrors the conclusions
of Binswanger (2000, 2004) who argued that the nexus
between growth rates in real activity and stock price
movements broke down in the 1980s, both in the United
States and in the G7 countries. High unemployment
appears to be a good signal for markets, which at first
glance may seem counterintuitive, as it measures under-
utilization of resources. Although Boyd, Hu, and Jag-
annathan (2005) note that rising unemployment is
indeed followed by slower growth, they also report that,
during expansion periods, this effect is dominated by an
expectation of declining future interest rates. As a result,
the stock market usually rises following bad news from
the labour market. Lastly, interest rates are inversely
TABLE 2 Summary statistics
Panel unit root tests
Variable
No.
obs. Mean St. Dev.
25th
percentile Median
75th
percentile
Levin, Lin
and Chu t*
Im,
Pesaran
and Shin
W-stat
Maddala
and Wu
Fisher-ADF
Return 1,185 3.7288 36.9573 −14.5047 7.9846 25.4783 −31.23*** −24.19*** 795.11***
Debt 711 56.1297 33.1425 31.9661 52.3361 72.8350 −3.50*** −0.07 130.68*
ΔDebt 650 0.2618 8.4075 −2.7320 −0.2252 2.4655 −5,779.30*** −451.57*** 232.87***
Δlnσ 1,155 −1.2826 34.7910 −26.2779 −5.3994 18.8132 −30.16*** −24.18*** 795.07***
Interest_Rate 1,208 11.9409 74.3617 2.9296 5.6858 9.6177 −122.29*** −38.61*** 357.72***
Tax_Increase 862 −0.0308 1.3130 −0.5118 0.0559 0.5654 −21.74*** −16.18*** 499.42***
GDP_Growth 1,481 3.2165 4.0818 1.5217 3.3684 5.3605 −18.43*** −17.63*** 537.24***
Unemployment 1,220 8.3143 4.7750 4.6000 7.6000 10.5000 −4.08*** −3.94*** 175.19***
Inflation 1,451 20.4540 242.5861 1.9739 3.5366 7.5838 −231.94*** −75.44*** 1,087.79***
Note: See Table 1 for variable definitions. *** and * denote rejection of the unit root hypothesis at 1% and 10% significance level, respectively.
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related to market valuations, which is particularly appar-
ent in Model (4). This is not surprising, since a higher
rate of interest leads to heavier discounting of future cash
flows generated by companies and translates into higher
costs of servicing corporate debt.
The measures of fit seem to be much better for the
two-way fixed effect panels. This is primarily due to the
fact that the year dummies are able to capture the com-
mon global trend in stock market movements and effec-
tively isolate the domestic component of returns. The
hypothesis that the regressors do not have explanatory
power is rejected in all specifications. We also note that
Inflation is not included in the set of independent vari-
ables, as it is highly correlated with Interest_Rate
(ρ = 0.87). Its inclusion could lead to multicollinearity
problems and inflated standard errors. As specified, our
models do not suffer from multicollinearity and the
highest variance inflation factor (VIF) in the models is
1.18. According to Chatterjee and Price (1991), estimation
problems can arise when VIFs exceed the value of 10.
In summary, the findings in Table 3 support the claim
that increases in central government's indebtedness
diminish the wealth of shareholders. At this stage, it is
important to ask through which channels this relation-
ship establishes itself in the data. We will consider three
possible mechanisms and endeavour to verify related evi-
dence. Firstly, issuance of new debt erodes the creditwor-
thiness of the government and increases the probability
of its default. Such political uncertainties could poten-
tially translate into higher stock market risk. Secondly,
the action of selling newly issued government bonds and
bills may increase interest rates, consequently depressing
stock prices. Lastly, the need to borrow may reflect struc-
tural problems in balancing the budget and signal future
tax increases. In what follows, we investigate each of the
possible explanations in greater detail.
4.2 | Government debt and stock market
riskiness
In the seminal model of corporate debt pricing proposed
by Merton (1974), the probability that a company will go
bankrupt increases nonlinearly in the present value of
debt relative to the current value of the firm. A similar
relationship holds if the situation is assessed from the
point of view of governments. As new debt is issued, the
probability of default increases, undermining creditwor-
thiness and credit ratings. Aizenman, Hutchison, and
Jinjarak (2013) use a large sample of countries to show
that spreads on sovereign credit default swaps, which
represent the cost of default insurance, increase with the
public debt-to-tax base ratio. Notably, exceeding the debt
capacity can also destabilize a country politically. In
recent years, this has been witnessed in Greece, which
balanced precariously on the edge of solvency. During
TABLE 3 Return regressions
Pooled least squares estimation Two-way fixed effect panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 4.2756*** (1.4722) 1.9197 (4.6258)
ΔDebti,t −0.4315** (0.2001) −0.6529** (0.2762) −0.3876** (0.1641) −0.9540*** (0.2312)
GDP_Growthi,t −0.4014 (0.5424) −0.2442 (0.5888)
Unemploymenti,t 0.9358** (0.4568) 1.8005** (0.7924)
Interest_Ratei,t −0.3937 (0.3533) −1.4105** (0.5953)
Adjusted R2 0.6352% 1.4963% 57.9470% 55.4374%
Number of observations 572 402 572 402
F-stat (regression) 4.6504 2.5228 11.9279 8.2298
Prob (F-stat) 0.0315 0.0406 0.0000 0.0000
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 11.9412 8.3931
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000
Note: The models estimated in the table can be expressed as Returni,t = β0,i + β1,t + β2ΔDebti,t + β3GDP_Growthi,t + β4Unemploymenti,
t + β5Interest_Ratei,t + εI,t. Instead of using country-specific and time-specific fixed effects, Models (1) and (2) rely on estimating a common
intercept. Models (1) and (3) introduce a restriction of β3 = β4 = β5 = 0. The dependent variable in the models above is continuously com-
pounded return on MSCI county stock market index denominated in US dollars. Definitions of the explanatory variables are provided in
Table 1. To conserve space, the fixed effects are not reported. F-stat (Regression) tests the hypothesis that the model has no explanatory
power, while F-stat (redundant fixed effects) is for the null that both cross section and period fixed effects can be omitted. Parameter stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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the period of 2007–2015, this country had no less than
seven different prime ministers. In general, policy uncer-
tainty has been documented to adversely affect stock
prices and to exacerbate investment risk (Antonakakis,
Chatziantoniou, & Filis, 2013; Baker et al., 2016;
Bittlingmayer, 1998; Pástor & Veronesi, 2013).
The above arguments explain why debt-financed fis-
cal profligacy can create a hazardous investment environ-
ment. However, one needs to bear in mind that there
could be strong offsetting effects. Fiscal policy may be
deliberately counter-cyclical, with stimulus or bailout
packages and automatic fiscal stabilizers having a damp-
ening effect on economic fluctuations (Brown, 1955;
Fatás & Mihov, 2001; Fernández-Villaverde, 2010; Wren-
Lewis, 2010). That being the case, questions can be raised
about the net effect of these opposing forces. We endeav-
our to measure it empirically by linking changes in stock
market risk to increases in government indebtedness.
Table 4 reports the estimates of four models where Δlnσ
is taken as a dependent variable.
The sign of the coefficient on ΔDebt appears to
change depending on specification, with statistical signif-
icance being reached only in one model and at merely
10% level. The assertion that increases in government
borrowing aggravate investment risk finds little support
in the data. Consequently, the story that the stock price
declines accompanying debt expansion are caused by
jumps in risk premium should be treated with scepticism.
Furthermore, other macroeconomic variables lack consis-
tency in terms of the strength of their predictive power.
Most variation can be explained by the period dummies,
indicating that stock markets are strongly integrated and
tend to change their riskiness simultaneously. Overall,
the findings presented in this section suggest that we
need to look for drivers other than risk to rationalize the
negative debt-return nexus.
4.3 | Are interest rates affected?
Whenever a government takes large quantities of bonds
and bills to the market, they compete with private debt and
drive up the interest rates (Blinder & Solow, 1973). This
could potentially raise the level of private interest rates in
the economy and negatively affect stock prices. However,
as Friedman (1978) reminds us, the conclusions of Blinder
and Solow (op cit) hinge upon the assumption that govern-
ment bonds and private sector real capital are perfect sub-
stitutes and, should this assumption be violated, debt-
financed deficits will not necessarily lead to the
abovementioned portfolio crowding out effect. The aca-
demic discussion is further complicated by the fact that
prior empirical papers fail to reach a consensus regarding
the impact of fiscal imbalances on interest rates (Ardagna,
Caselli, & Lane, 2007; Evans, 1985; Faini, 2006;
Laubach, 2009; Plosser, 1982, 1987).
TABLE 4 Empirical determinants of Δlnσ
Pooled least squares estimation Two-way fixed effect panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.0912 (1.5487) 1.7407 (4.8157)
ΔDebti,t −0.2270 (0.2199) −0.1124 (0.3031) 0.2911* (0.1562) 0.2999 (0.2217)
GDP_Growthi,t 0.2879 (0.5683) −0.4060 (0.5711)
Unemploymenti,t −0.8881* (0.4760) −0.4184 (0.7789)
Interest_Ratei,t 0.6651* (0.3685) 0.5830 (0.5800)
Adjusted R2 0.0116% 0.7111% 66.5025% 62.0168%
Number of observations 564 397 564 397
F-stat (regression) 1.0654 1.7090 16.7426 10.3705
Prob (F-stat) 0.3024 0.1472 0.0000 0.0000
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 16.9363 10.7338
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000
Note: The regressions above model the continuously compounded increase in stock market risk, which is measured by standard deviation of
daily MSCI index returns within a given calendar year. This is done by estimating equations of the following form Δlnσi,t = β0,i + β1,t
+ β2ΔDebti,t + β3GDP_Growthi,t + β4Unemploymenti,t + β5Interest_Ratei,t + εI,t. Models (1) and (2) restrict the country and time fixed effects
to zero and instead use a common intercept. Specifications (1) and (3) assume that β3 = β4 = β5 = 0. For the exact definitions of explanatory
variables, see Table 1. F-stat (Regression) tests the hypothesis that the model has no explanatory power, while F-stat (redundant fixed effects)
is for the null that both cross-section and period fixed effects can be omitted. Parameter standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, *
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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If our investigation shows that expansions of govern-
ment debt lead to higher level of interest rates, this will
have ramifications for stock market prices. Since the cash
flows generated by stocks will be discounted more
heavily, equities will consequently depreciate in value.
This, in turn, will diminish the wealth of households and
could reduce their consumption of corporate products.
As the option of buying consumer durables on hire pur-
chase becomes more costly, consumption will drop even
further (Engen & Hubbard, 2005). Moreover, interest rate
rises imply higher costs of servicing variable-rate corpo-
rate debt and, therefore, diminished profits. Lastly, high
borrowing costs can reduce investors' demand for stocks,
as investing on margin becomes less affordable. All of
these effects could potentially coincide to produce signifi-
cant falls in stock prices.
Table 5 reports parameter estimates for models that
link the interest rate level to increases in government
debt and control variables. Inflation appears as a regres-
sor in all specifications and always has a t-statistic in
excess of 40. This means that dropping it could result in
severe omitted variable bias. The most important finding
in Table 5 is the robust rejection of the Ricardian equiva-
lence. An increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio by
1 percentage point appears to raise interest rate by about
6–10 basis points. These estimates are twice as large as
those obtained for the United States by Engen and Hub-
bard (2005) and Laubach (2009). Consequently, in our
sample, expansions in central government indebtedness
increase interest rates in a non-trivial way which, in turn,
has dire ramifications for stock markets.
The interest rate modelled here is that accruing to
depositors. This is quite sensible, because as Cebula (1985)
pointed out, for the crowding out effect to affect the pri-
vate sector, government borrowing needs to influence pri-
vate interest rates. Interestingly, the World Development
Indicators data set also includes information on bank lend-
ing rates for short- and medium-term loans. We replicate
our regressions with the lending rates acting as the depen-
dent variable and report our findings in Appendix B
(Table B1). The debt-neutrality hypothesis is again rejected
in most of the specifications and the sensitivity of lending
rate with respect to ΔDebt seems to be even greater than
that recorded for deposit rates. As a side note, we would
like to point out that the same is true of sensitivity to infla-
tion, which suggests that the loan-deposit interest rate
spread increases in an inflationary environment. Another
issue that has been pointed out by Faini (2006) and
Ardagna et al. (2007) is that the interest rate effect could
be asymmetric. Since debt increases are more worrying in
countries that already have an above-average indebtedness
level, the market reaction could potentially be stronger.
However, we have discovered that once the fixed effects
and relevant controls are incorporated into our model, no
evidence of asymmetries could be found.
Taken together, the results presented in this
section attest to the fact that government decisions to
increase borrowing are accompanied by jumps in interest
TABLE 5 Modelling the interest rate
Pooled least squares estimation Two-way fixed effect panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 3.0527*** (0.1725) 2.1632*** (0.4307)
ΔDebti,t 0.0959*** (0.0248) 0.1027*** (0.0281) 0.0729*** (0.0175) 0.0622*** (0.0193)
GDP_Growthi,t −0.0028 (0.0534) −0.2270*** (0.0445)
Unemploymenti,t 0.1084** (0.0430) −0.1903*** (0.0596)
Inflationi,t 0.4653*** (0.0107) 0.4662*** (0.0114) 0.4288*** (0.0076) 0.4203*** (0.0082)
Adjusted R2 86.0531% 86.9555% 95.0568% 95.6291%
Number of observations 468 431 468 431
F-stat (regression) 1,441.7132 717.5992 120.7366 126.4363
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 12.6021 12.9063
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000
Note: The generalized expression for the regressions presented in this table can be written as ΔInterest_Ratei,t = β0,i + β1,t + β2ΔDebti,t
+ β3GDP_Growthi,t + β4Unemploymenti,t + β5Inflationi,t + εI,t. Specifications (1) and (2) dispense of the country and year fixed effects and
employ a pooled OLS estimation. Models (1) and (3) restrict β3 and β4 to 0. For the exact variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. The first
F-statistic is for the hypothesis that the model has no explanatory power, while the second one is for the null that both cross- ection and
period fixed effects are redundant. Parameter standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
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rates, which can adversely affect share prices through
several channels. However, this is unlikely to be the end
of the story. After all, our results in Table 3 indicated that
the strong negative relationship between Return and
ΔDebt persists even after controlling for the level of inter-
est rates. Clearly, other forces must also be at play here.
To probe this issue further, we investigate whether gov-
ernment debt issuance may signal increases in future tax
burden.
4.4 | Tax implications of government
debt expansion
In the absence of sales of public assets, the government
needs to satisfy a borrowing constraint equating current
debt to the present value of expected future surpluses
(Chung & Leeper, 2007; Smith & Zin, 1991). Fiscal sur-
pluses may not be easily achievable, as cuts to public
spending can prove politically perilous. An alternative
way to follow would be to increase the tax burden. Need-
less to say, raising taxes on corporate profits, capital gains
or dividends reduces cash flows to shareholders and can
result in stock prices declines. Taxation can also lead to a
significant deadweight loss (Feldstein, 1999) and expan-
sion of the underground economy (Tanzi, 1983). The side
effects of high corporate tax rates are particularly trouble-
some and include lower economic growth (Lee &
Gordon, 2005) as well as declines in investments, FDI
and entrepreneurial activity (Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh,
Ramalho, & Shleifer, 2010). All of these unintended con-
sequences of the tax burden can further aggravate stock
market falls.
On the one hand, debt issuance may be viewed as an
innocuous way to smooth government revenue. On the
other hand, it may be an ominous sign that structural
budget imbalances are present and that the future tax
burden will have to rise. We verify empirically whether
public debt expansion is followed by increases in tax
revenue-to-GDP ratio by estimating the following model:
Tax_Increasei,t = β0,i + β1,t + β2ΔDebti,t
+
Xn1
j=1
β2+ jΔDebti,t− j + βn1+ 3Inflationi,t + εi,t
All variables appearing in the equation above have
been defined in Table 1. β0,i and β1,t stand for the country
and year fixed effects, while εi,t denotes a random resid-
ual. Table 6 reports the estimated parameters of the
model. Specifications (1) and (2) assume that
β0,1 = β0,2 = … = β0,N and β1,1 = β1,2 = … = β1,T, while
Regressions (1) and (3) restrict βn1 + 3 coefficient to zero.
We would also like to note that (β3 + β4 + … + βn1 + 2)
represents the total increase in the tax revenue-to-GDP
ratio in the n1 years following the year in which an
increase in public debt equivalent to 1% of GDP took
place.
Beginning our analysis with Model (1), we selected
the lag length n1 by using the Akaike criterion
(Akaike, 1973, 1974) and capping the maximum number
of lags at 4. This selection criterion indicated that 4 lags
should be included. It should be noted that selecting
higher-order models leads to a substantial loss of degrees
of freedom, since we are dealing with a panel with a rela-
tively large cross-sectional dimension. Turning our atten-
tion to the results, it can be seen that the value of β2
coefficient is negative, which suggests the presence of
debt-financed tax cuts. However, the statistical signifi-
cance of this finding is debatable and such policy actions
are not sustainable in the long run. This is clear, as the
initial cut is followed by tax increases, which are of much
greater magnitude (i.e., j β2j < (β3 + β4 + β5 + β6)). This
is true regardless of the estimation method. The cumula-
tive tax hikes in the 4 years following the year of debt
expansion are statistically significant in all of the regres-
sions (i.e., the null of H0: β3 + β4 + β5 + β6 = 0 is consis-
tently rejected). Such results indicate that the growing
indebtedness of government does not simply represent
ephemeral government revenue smoothing. Instead, it
signals a structural deficit problem that will need to be
addressed by changing taxation policy in the years to
follow.
Some economists of the Keynesian persuasion would
argue that, due to its short-term growth boosting effect, a
debt-financed expansion may be desirable, even if it is
not sustainable over a long period. However, since our
Tax_Increase variable is defined as the first difference in
tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, our estimates indicate that the
tax burden in 4 years following debt expansion increases
faster than GDP. This is undoubtedly bad news for com-
panies and investors alike. Therefore, if agents are ratio-
nal and forward-looking, increases in government
indebtedness will have to result in immediate decreases
in stock prices. This is why, in addition to the interest
channel, the tax effects can be propounded as a rationali-
zation for the negative association between Return
and ΔDebt.
Although somewhat tangential to our main analysis,
it is interesting to note that the coefficient on Inflation is
negative, and significantly so in the two-way fixed effect
panel. This may suggest that some countries are trying to
inflate their way out of financial difficulties without
resorting to increasing the tax burden. Such a policy
could be implemented by using the open market opera-
tions of the central bank. It goes without saying that gov-
ernments operating in countries where central banks are
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strongly independent or those residing in the Euro zone
will be restricted in pursuing such policy avenues.
5 | FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In what follows, we present alternative specifications of
the stock returns model introduced in the previous sec-
tion. Since the joint hypothesis of redundant country-
and year-fixed effects is consistently rejected in the
returns regressions, we constrain ourselves to presenting
two-way fixed effect panel models with a full set of con-
trols. The first concern that we want to contemplate
relates to whether the reaction to public debt issuance is
uniform across different countries, regardless of their
level of indebtedness. Presumably, investors could
become more apprehensive and agitated in cases where
the public debt burden is already sizable. Here, we use a
60% debt-to-GDP threshold to distinguish between the
nations that are heavily laden with debt and those that
are not. Our threshold selection is motivated by the fact
that across EU member states a limit of 60% had been
imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 and its
importance was further underscored by the Fiscal Com-
pact of 2012 (Lane, 2012). To operationalize our inquiry,
we created a dummy variable indicating heavily indebted
countries and label it accordingly as I(Debti,t > 60%). Sub-
sequently, we interact I(Debti,t > 60%) as well as (1- I
(Debti,t > 60%)) with ΔDebt and enter the resultant con-
structs as explanatory variables into our return regres-
sion. Such an approach permits us to differentiate the
strength of the stock market reaction to debt issuance
conditional on the level of government liabilities. The
estimation results (displayed in Column (1) of Table 7)
reveal that increasing public debt by 1% of GDP in coun-
tries that are below our debt threshold leads to a 75 basis
points decrease in returns. An analogous estimate of a
fall for the highly indebted countries is 109 basis points.
While this difference between the two estimates may
appear sensible and nontrivial from an economic per-
spective, it is insignificant from a statistical point of view
(p-value = .4309).
Another important issue that we ought to consider at
this stage is that not all forms of debt are equal. Govern-
ments that have control over their own legal tender and
central bank may resort to monetizing their domestic
TABLE 6 Empirical models for Tax_Increase
Pooled least squares estimation Two-way fixed effect panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −0.0567 (0.0588) −0.0132 (0.0745)
ΔDebti,t −0.0298*** (0.0079) −0.0350*** (0.0081) −0.0015 (0.0094) −0.0094 (0.0097)
ΔDebti,t-1 −0.0152* (0.0089) −0.0080 (0.0092) 0.0045 (0.0102) 0.0199* (0.0109)
ΔDebti,t-2 0.0301*** (0.0092) 0.0252*** (0.0093) 0.0302*** (0.0106) 0.0272** (0.0106)
ΔDebti,t-3 0.0141 (0.0100) 0.0150 (0.0099) 0.0041 (0.0110) 0.0019 (0.0109)
ΔDebti,t-4 0.0161 (0.0111) 0.0132 (0.0110) 0.0008 (0.0121) −0.0032 (0.0120)
Inflationi,t −0.0151 (0.0124) −0.0609*** (0.0208)
Adjusted R2 6.3392% 6.2635% 16.7546% 16.9218%
Number of observations 411 403 411 403
F-stat (regression) 6.5500 5.4770 2.2326 2.2221
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 1.8173 1.8328
Prob (F-stat) 0.0005 0.0004
β3+ β4+ β5+ β6 0.0452 0.0455 0.0397 0.0458
F-stat (H0: β3+ β4+ β5+ β6 = 0) 7.6738 7.8884 3.0742 4.1770
Prob (F-stat) 0.0059 0.0052 0.0804 0.0418
Note: The regressions presented above link increases in tax burden to the current and past government debt changes and inflation. The gen-
eral regression equation can be written as follows: Tax_Increasei,t = β0,i + β1,t + β2ΔDebti,t + β3ΔDebti,t-1 + β4ΔDebti,t-2 + β5ΔDebti,t-
3 + β6ΔDebti,t-4 + β7Inflationi,t + εI,t. Models (1) and (2) assume that (β0,1 = β0,2 = … = β0,N) and (β1,1 = β1,2 = … = β1,T) and introduce pooled
intercept instead. Models (1) and (3) restrict β7 to 0. In addition to the null hypotheses that the regression has no explanatory power and that
the fixed effects are redundant, a third null is tested. It verifies whether historical debt increases are tax-neutral. Parameter standard errors
are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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currency denominated debt in times of need. Needless to
say, such liberties cannot be taken with respect to sover-
eign debt, making the likelihood of default appreciably
higher. To delve into this issue empirically, we collect
new data from the World Development Indicators data-
base and construct the External_Debt variable, which
divides the external public debt stocks by GDP. By
regarding all non-external debt as domestic, we further
create a Domestic_Debt variable, which is likewise scaled
by GDP. Both of these indicators, in their first-differenced
from, are entered into our return regression (see Specifi-
cation (2) in Table 7). Although increases in both types of
government debt significantly depress stock valuations,
their impact is not homogeneous. As anticipated, the det-
rimental impact of foreign debt is more severe, which is
evidenced by the significantly higher regression coeffi-
cient (p-value = .0089). Some caution is advised when
interpreting these results, as the data used for this estima-
tion were available only for 17 countries. Nevertheless,
governments that consider equity investors to be an
integral part of their electorate are advised to carefully
consider the forms of debt that they plan to issue.
Our next point of inquiry relates to the selection of
the functional form. In our prior estimations, we have
presupposed that the relationship between changes in
debt and stock prices is linear. Specification (3) in Table 7
disposes of this assumption and includes a squared ΔDebt
term as an explanatory variable. This term proves to be
statistically significant at the 5% level and bears a nega-
tive coefficient. Such a finding points towards the exis-
tence of concavity in the function of interest. While the
returns increase with debt reductions, they do so at a
diminishing rate. On the other end of the spectrum, huge
increases in public debt decrease the returns more than
linearly, which could potentially reflect the devastating
impact of defaults and financial panics.
Last but not least, we investigate whether there is any
evidence of a delayed response of stock market prices to
changes in public debt. Unless central government
indebtedness is explicitly considered as a risk factor, an
TABLE 7 Alternative specifications of return regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔDebti,t × (1-I(Debti,t > 60%)) −0.7463** (0.3506)
ΔDebti,t × I(Debti,t > 60%) −1.0909*** (0.2893)
ΔExternal_Debti,t −2.9750*** (0.7013)
ΔDomestic_Debti,t −1.3001*** (0.3756)
ΔDebti,t −0.6815*** (0.2603) −1.0168*** (0.2490)
ΔDebti,t × ΔDebti,t −0.0219** (0.0098)
Lagged ΔDebti,t −0.3550 (0.2352)
GDP_Growthi,t −0.2627 (0.5896) −3.1306*** (1.1188) −0.2883 (0.5856) −0.0296 (0.6423)
Unemploymenti,t 1.7058** (0.8019) 0.1526 (1.4162) 1.5776** (0.7940) 1.8998** (0.8967)
Interest_Ratei,t −1.3945** (0.5960) −1.5128 (0.9367) −1.3104** (0.5935) −1.3347** (0.6421)
Adjusted R2 55.3866% 55.3700% 55.9650% 55.2429%
Number of observations 402 140 402 362
F-stat (regression) 8.1119 5.1059 8.2806 7.5526
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 8.3212 5.2337 8.5697 7.7098
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: All regressions reported in this table are two-way fixed effect panels. The dependent variable in the models above is continuously com-
pounded return on MSCI county stock market index denominated in US dollars. The regressions presented can be expressed as Returni,t
= β0,i + β1,t + β2ΔDebti,t × (1-I(Debti,t > 60%)) + β3ΔDebti,t × I(Debti,t > 60%) + β4ΔExternal_Debti,t + β5ΔDomestic_Debti,t + β6ΔDebti,t
+ β7ΔDebti,t × ΔDebti,t + β8Lagged ΔDebti,t + β9GDP_Growthi,t + β10Unemploymenti,t + β11Interest_Ratei,t + εI,t. Specification (1) assumes
that β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 = 0, Model (2) takes β2 = β3 = β6 = β7 = β8 = 0, Model (3) restricts β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β8 = 0, while (4) imposes
a restriction of β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β7 = 0. I(Debti,t > 60%) is a dummy variable taking the value of one whenever the debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeds 60%. ΔExternal_Debti,t is the first difference in the external public debt stocks-to-GDP ratio, while the ΔDomestic_Debti,t is the first
difference in the domestic central government debt-to-GDP ratio. Definitions of the remaining explanatory variables are provided in Table 1.
To conserve space, the fixed effects are not reported. F-stat (Regression) tests the hypothesis that the model has no explanatory power, while
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) is for the null that both cross section and period fixed effects can be omitted. Parameter standard errors are
given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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observation that ΔDebt forecasts future returns would
run contrary to the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(Fama, 1970). In an efficient market, future prices should
follow a random walk and be completely unpredictable.
To examine this issue in greater detail, we include lagged
ΔDebt as an additional explanatory variable in our return
model. According to the findings reported in column (4)
of Table 7, the impact of this variable is negative, which
is consistent with our a priori expectations. Although the
redundancy of this variable cannot be rejected at the con-
ventional significance levels, the associated p-value is rel-
atively low and equal to 0.13. It can be further inferred
from the estimates that an increase in public debt by 1%
of GDP reduces stock returns by a total of 137 basis
points over a two-year period.
6 | CONCLUSIONS
This article contributes to the vigorous debate on the
impact of fiscal policy by showing that stock price perfor-
mance is weakened by the issuance of additional public
debt. In order to rationalize this finding, we empirically
tested auxiliary hypotheses. First, the stock declines do
not seem to be accompanied by elevated levels of return
volatility, which invalidates justifications based on the
risk premium story. Second, we examine the pressure
that increasing government debt exert on interest rates.
Despite over 40 years of theoretical and empirical
research in this area, there is still little consensus about
the strength of such pressure and the size of the arising
effect. Using an international sample, we show that inter-
est rates increase between 6 and 10 basis points when
government debt is increased by 1% of GDP. From the
perspective of stock market investors, the situation is
exacerbated even further by the fact that the costs of ser-
vicing bloated public sector borrowing are financed by
future increases in the tax burden.
Our findings have a range of practical implications.
First, they highlight the importance of fiscal self-restraint
to policy makers. Future governments may find the prior-
itization of the balanced budget imperative difficult, as
the population of developing countries is ageing
(Alesina, 2012). However, many pension funds are
heavily invested in equity markets and issuance of more
public debt could seriously undermine the quality of life
of senior citizens. Second, the results provide clear-cut
guidance to international investors. In selecting their
portfolio composition, forward-looking stock market par-
ticipants may want to underweight countries that are
expected to run chronic budget deficits financed by debt.
Our findings with regard to interest rate behaviour could
also be instructive to those who have committed their
funds to fixed income instruments. Last but not least, the
insights provided are food for thought for some voters
who believe that rising government liabilities are of no
immediate concern, as the burden of debt repayment can
be left to future generations. This is a somewhat mis-
guided notion, as the ramifications of such actions are
felt immediately in capital markets.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF SAMPLE COUNTRIES
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Ire-
land, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sin-
gapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Tur-
key, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,
United States, Zimbabwe
Appendix B
TABLE B1 Determinants of the lending interest rate
Pooled least squares estimation Two-way fixed effect panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 1.1015*** (0.3145) 0.0486 (0.7784)
ΔDebti,t 0.0596 (0.0448) 0.0984* (0.0509) 0.1379*** (0.0440) 0.2174*** (0.0480)
GDP_Growthi,t 0.2306** (0.0978) 0.5688*** (0.1143)
Unemploymenti,t 0.0416 (0.0792) 0.3850*** (0.1470)
Inflationi,t 1.7953*** (0.0196) 1.8125*** (0.0208) 1.7920*** (0.0192) 1.8319*** (0.0210)
Adjusted R2 96.5770% 96.8615% 97.7217% 98.0346%
Number of observations 468 448 468 448
F-stat (regression) 6842.8356 3449.8549 282.1169 302.3045
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F-stat (redundant fixed effects) 276.2994 286.7412
Prob (F-stat) 0.0000 0.0000
Note: The dependent variable in the regressions is the bank lending rate on short- and medium-term loans (Lending_Interest_Rate). The
models reported in the table can be written as ΔLending_Interest_Ratei,t = β0,i + β1,t + β2ΔDebti,t + β3GDP_Growthi,t + β4Unemploymenti,
t + β5Inflationi,t + εi,t. Instead of employing two-way fixed effect estimation, specifications (1) and (2) report pooled OLS results. Models (1)
and (3) restrict β3 and β4 to 0. For the exact definitions of explanatory variables, please refer to Table 1. The first F-statistic is for the hypothe-
sis that the model has no explanatory power, while the second one is for the null that both cross section and period fixed effects are redun-
dant. Parameter standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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